Abstract. In this paper the newly proposed RMAC system is analysed. The scheme allows a (traditional MAC) attack some control over one of two keys of the underlying block cipher and makes it possible to mount several related-key attacks on RMAC. First, an efficient attack on RMAC when used with triple-DES is presented, which rely also on other findings in the proposed draft standard. Second, a generic attack on RMAC is presented which can be used to find one of the two keys in the system faster than by an exhaustive search. Third, related-key attacks on RMAC in a multi-user setting are presented. In addition to beating the claimed security bounds in NIST's RMAC proposal, this work suggests that, as a general principle, one may wish to avoid designing modes of operation that use related keys.
Introduction
RMAC [6, 2] is an authentication system based on a block cipher. The block cipher algorithms currently approved to be used in RMAC are the AES and triple-DES.
RMAC is based on a block cipher with b-bit blocks and k-bit keys. RMAC takes as inputs: a message D of an arbitrary number of bits, two keys K1, K2 each of k bits and a salt R of r bits, where r ≤ k. It produces an m-bit MAC value, where m ≤ b. The method is as follows (see also Figure 1 ). First pad D with a 1 bit followed by enough 0 bits to ensure that the length of the resulting string is a multiple of b. Encrypt the padded string using the block cipher in CBC mode using the key K1. The last ciphertext block is then encrypted with the key K3 = K2 + R where '+' is addition modulo 2. The resulting ciphertext is then truncated to m bits to form the MAC. The two keys K1, K2 may be generated from one k-bit key in a standard way [6] .
There are five parameter sets in [6] for each of two block sizes. In Appendix A of [6] it is noted that for RMAC with two independent keys K1 and K2 an exhaustive search for the keys is expected to require the generation of 2 2k−1
MACs, where k is the size of one key. However, for the cases with m = b this can be done much faster under a chosen message attack with just one known message and one chosen message. Independently of how the two keys are generated, an exhaustive search for the key K2 requires only an expected number of 2 k decryptions of the block cipher [5] . Given a message D and the MAC using the salt R, request the MAC of D again. With a high probability this MAC is computed with a salt R , such that R = R. For these two MACs, the values just before the final encryption will be equal and K2 can be found after about 2 k decryption operations. Subsequently, K1 can be found in roughly the same time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In §2 an attack on RMAC used with three-key triple-DES is presented. The attack finds all three DES keys in time roughly that of three times an exhaustive search for a DES key using only a few MACs. §3 presents an attack on RMAC used with any block cipher. The attack finds one of the two keys in the system faster than by an exhaustive search. In §4 we present a construction-level related-key attack against RMAC and in §5 we describe some ways to exploit the related-key attack of §4 when attacking multiple users.
Attack on RMAC with three-key triple DES
One of the block cipher algorithms approved to be used in RMAC is triple-DES with 168-bit keys. Consider RMAC with parameter set II, that is with 64-bit MACs and a 64-bit salt. The key for the final encryption is then K3 = K2 + (R 0 104 ). However, it is not specified in [6] how the three DES keys are derived from K3. Assume that the first DES key is taken as the rightmost 56 bits of K2 + (R 0 104 ), the second DES as the middle 56 bits, and the third DES as the leftmost 56 bits. Assume an attacker is given two MACs of the same message D but using two different values, R and R of the salt. Assume that the rightmost eight bits of both R and R are equal. Then the encryption of the last same block for the two MACs is done using triple-DES where for one MAC the key used is (a, b, c) , and where for the other MAC the key used is (a, b, c ⊕ d) . Since the attacker knows d, he can decrypt through a single DES operation, find c in 2 56 operations and derive one of the three DES keys [3] . This attack has a probability of success of 2 −8 . If the attack fails, it is repeated for other values of D, R, and/or R . After the third DES key has been found, it is possible to find the second DES key with similar complexity. Note that eight bits of the salt affect the second DES key. Request the MAC of a message D 2 using two different values of the salt. Decrypt through the final DES component with the third DES key. With a probability of 1 − 2 −8 the two second DES keys in the final encryption will be different as a result of different salt values. Since the salts are known by the attacker, one finds the second DES in about 2 56 operations. Subsequently, the final DES key can be found using 2 56 MAC verifications [4] as follows. Assume one is given the MACs, M 1 and M 2 , of two different messages D 1 and D 2 , each consisting of an arbitrary number of bits. Let P 1 and P 2 be the padding bits used in the respective MAC computations. Request the MAC, M 3 , of the message D 1 P 1 E, where E is a one-block message. Let x 1 , x 2 and x 3 be the values just before the final triple DES encryptions in the computations of M 1 , M 2 and M 3 . Given the value of the final single-DES key of K2 one can compute also the MAC of the message D 2 P 2 (E ⊕ x 1 ⊕ x 2 ). Note that the value just before the final triple DES encryptions in this case is x 3 . Also note that the attacker has full control over the key bits which are modified using the (random) salts. Therefore this last part of the attack works regardless of how the salts are chosen, as long as the attacker knows them. In total, with 2 known and 1 chosen MAC, one finds the third DES key of K2 using 2 56 MAC verifications or alternatively using 2 56 chosen messages.
A generic attack
In this section we present an attack on the RMAC system with parameter set II for b = 64 and RMAC with parameter set V for b = 128. The attack finds the value of K2 after which RMAC reduces to a simple CBC-MAC for which it is well-known that simple forgeries can be found. In the following, let d K (x) denote the decryption of x using the key K for the underlying block cipher. The attack is based on multiple collisions.
Definition 1. A t-collision for a MAC is a set of t messages all producing the same MAC value.
We shall make use of the following lemma which is easily proved.
Lemma 1. Let A, B, and C be boolean variables. Then

A ⇒ B ⇔ not(B) ⇒ not(A), and A ⇒ (B AND C) ⇔ not(B) OR not(C) ⇒ not(A).
Let D be some message (with an arbitrary no. of blocks 
In this way an exhaustive search for K2 can be made faster than brute-force. In some rare cases one gets equal values in the inequality tests.
.. after which all false alarms are expected to be detected. The expected number of false alarms is t + t − 1 2 .
Let us show the case of a 3-collision in more details. Assume that the random numbers, the salts used, are R 0 , R 1 , and R 2 (which are known to the attacker). Since the messages are the same for all MACs and since the MACs are equal, say M , one knows that the keys K2 + R 0 , K2 + R 1 , and K2 + R 2 all decrypt M to the same (unknown) message z, thus
The following implications are immediate. Lemma 1 enables us to rewrite the above implications as follows.
Summing up, with a 3-collision (provided a 0 , a 1 are different) one can check the values of four keys from three decryption operations.
Let us next assume that there is a 4-collision. Let the four keys in the 4-collision be
, and d L+a2 (M ), one can check the validity of four keys. Moreover, by arguments similar to the case of a 3-collision, from the four decryptions, one can check the values of all keys of the form K + a i + a j , where Consider the case t = 3. One can assume a 0 = a 1 (otherwise there is no collision), and that with a high probability there are two bit positions where a 0 = a 1 . Without loss of generality assume that these are the two most significant bits and that these bits are "01" for a 0 and "10" for a 1 . Then a strategy is the following: Let L run through all keys where the most significant two bits are "00". Then clearly the sets
cover the entire key space and an exhaustive search for K2 is reduced by a factor of 4 3 , since in the attack one can check the value of four keys at the cost of three decryptions.
Consider the case t = 4. With a high probability the b-bit vectors a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 are pairwise different. Also, with a high probability there are three bit positions where a 0 , a 1 , and a 2 are linearly independent (viewed as three-bit vectors). Without loss of generality assume that the bits are the three most significant bits and that these are "001" for a 0 , "010" for a 1 and "100" for a 2 . Then a strategy is the following: Let L run through all keys where the most significant three bits are "000". Then clearly the sets For higher values of t the attacker's strategy becomes more complex. We claim that with a high probability ("good" values of a i ) the factor saved in an exhaustive search for the key is close to the value of u/t (see Table 1 ).
The following result shows the complexity of finding t-collisions [7] .
Lemma 2. Consider a set of s randomly chosen b-bit values. With s = c2
(t−1)b/t one expects to get one t-collision, where c ≈ (t!)
If it is assumed for a fixed message D and a (randomly chosen) salt R that the resulting MAC is a random m-bit value, one can apply the Lemma to estimate the number of texts needed to find a t-collision. Consider a few examples. With s = 2 (b+1)/2 one expects to get one pair of colliding MACs, that is, one (2-)collision. With s = (1.8)2 2b/3 one expects to get a 3-collision, that is, three MACs with equal values (6 1/3 ≈ 1.8). With s = (2.2)2 3b/4 one expects to get one 4-collision (24
, one gets that (t!) 1/t ≈ t/e for large t. Thus, with s = (t/e)2 (t−1)b/t one expects to get a t-collision. Table 2 lists the complexities of finding t-collisions depending on the block size b.
There are many variants of this attack depending on how many chosen texts the attacker has access to. Table 3 lists the complexities of some instantiations of the attacks, where for triple-DES the number of chosen texts has been chosen to be less than 2 64 (since the salt can be a maximum of 64 bits) and for AES the time complexity and the number of chosen texts needed have been made comparable. In both cases an exhaustive search for the key has been reduced by a factor of eight, so the correct value of the key can be expected trying half of that number of values. As a final remark, note that the message D in the attack need not be chosen nor known by the attacker. Therefore one can argue that this attack is stronger than a traditional "chosen-text" attack.
Construction-level related-key attacks
Another consequence of adding the salt to K2 is that it exposes the RMAC system to a construction-level related-key attack. Consider the RMAC system with parameter set II for b = 64 and RMAC with parameter set III, IV, or V for b = 128. Let K1, K2 and K1, K2 be two pairs of RMAC keys that are related by the difference K2 + K2 = X 0 k−r for some r-bit string X.
k−r )) with probability 1. An attacker can use this property to, for example, take a message MACed by one user (with keys K1, K2), change the salt by adding X 0 k−r , and then trick the second user (with related keys K1, K2 ) to accept the new MAC-salt pair as an authenticator for D.
Key-collision attacks
Even if an attacker cannot control or does not (a priori ) know the difference between multiple users' keys, an attacker can still exploit the related-key attack in §4. Consider RMAC with parameter set II for b = 64 and parameter set V for b = 128. Assume k = r (if r < k then treat the bits of K2 not affected by the salt as part of K1).
Let us start by assuming that we have two users who share the first key K1 but whose second keys K2 and K2 have some unknown relationship. To mount the construction-level related-key attack from §4 the attacker must first learn the relationship between K2 and K2 . One way to learn this difference would be to first force each user to MAC some fixed message 2 k/2 times. Let R i be the i-th salt used by the first user and let M i be the i-th MAC. Let R i be the i-th salt used by the second user and let M i be the i-th MAC.
If K2 + R i = K2 + R j for any indices i, j, then we have a key-collision for the key to the last block cipher application and M i = M j with probability 1. The attacker cannot observe the values K2+R i directly, but if he sees a collision M i = M j , then he guesses that the difference between K2 and K2 is R i + R j . Once this difference is known, the attacker can modify the MACs generated with K1, K2 to be valid MACs for K1, K2 . We expect to observe one collision M i = M j due to the key collision K2 + R i = K2 + R j , and we expect 2 k−m collisions M i = M j at random, but recall that we are assuming that k = m. Note that if M i = M j occurs at random but K2 + R i = K2 + R j , then with very high probability an attacker's subsequent forgery attempt will fail, and this is how we filter the signal from the noise. Now consider a group of 2 k/2 users, each with independently-selected random keys, and assume that the adversary forces each user to MAC some fixed message 2 k/2 times. Note that, given a group of users this size, we expect two users to share the same first key K1 and, by the above discussion, we expect one collision K2 + R i = K2 + R j for this pair of users. By looking for collisions M i = M j across different users, an attacker can guess the relationship between two users' keys, and thereby force a user to accept a message that wasn't MACed with its keys.
Unfortunately, this attack against 2 k/2 users has a much lower signal-tonoise ratio than the attack against two users who are known to share the first key K1. In particular, we expect approximately 2 2k−m collisions M i = M j at random. We filter the signal from the noise as before. The filtering step does not significantly slow down the attack since the attacker must already force 2 k/2 users to each MAC 2 k/2 messages and since we are assuming that k = m. As a concrete example, for AES with 128-bit keys, this attack works by forcing 2
